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Abstract
In an attempt to widen the perspective on the issue of moral enhancement, this paper raises the questi-
on of what kind of evil could we eliminate by morally enhancing ourselves, i.e. what kind of evil wo-
uld we still have to live with. Due to the complexity and diversity of philosophical analysis of evil, this 
study will be narrowed in scope by conforming to an implicit understanding of evil by some of the most 
prominent advocates of biomedical (moral) enhancement. We will compare two perspectives on evil: 
evil as a component of human nature – radical evil (Immanuel Kant), and “depersonalized” evil – the 
banality of evil (Hannah Arendt), together with an implicit consideration of evil by Th omas Douglas, 
Julian Savulescu, Ingmar Persson, and John Harris. Furthermore, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s “Th e-
odicy” will be used in the analysis of the necessity of the reduction of evil, in order to emphasise that 
human beings have limited knowledge, which is why we should take into consideration the principle 
of caution and the fragility of balance between good and evil. In the conclusion, we off er an answer to 
the question “What is a better world?” by taking into consideration often neglected tradition of moral 
philosophy in the works of Immanuel Kant and Hannah Arendt.
Key words: moral enhancement, evil, Immanuel Kant, Hannah Arendt, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
1. INTRODUCTION: HOW DID THE QUESTION OF MORAL 
ENHANCEMENT BECOME ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT 
TOPICS IN THE HUMAN ENHANCEMENT DEBATE?
Th e idea of human enhancement encourages the usage of biomedical means in order to 
“improve” human nature. Transhumanists, one of its most prominent supporters, suggest 
our current, rather poor “condition” is just an early stage of our development. We can rea-
ch the stage of utopia (Bostrom, 2008) only if we direct techno-scientifi c progress towards 
increasing our existing capacities. Opponents of biomedical enhancement, often called 
bioconservatives, see this as a dangerous path which could, broadly speaking, lead to the 
“destruction” of human nature, or at least of its most valuable components. Th eir worry 
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is that human enhancement technologies might be “dehumanizing” (Bostrom, 2005:203-
204). Following this “bioconservative” line, Jürgen Habermas, in Th e Future of Human 
Nature, suggests that the fact that someone has interfered with our genes (for example, 
our parents with the help of advanced reproductive technologies) could aff ect our “mo-
ral capacities” (Habermas, 2003:64-66). According to Habermas, knowing that someone 
has intervened in our “natural” history could change our understanding of ourselves as 
responsible political subjects, ones that are able to have independent moral judgement 
(Habermas, 2003:25). It is precisely the problem of the possible jeopardising of morality 
which serves as one of the most important, maybe even the last, “defending line” of bio-
medical enhancement technologies adoption, or at least that was the case until recently. 
For this reason, several years ago, promoters of human enhancement came up with the 
“perfect” solution. Th ey exposed the gap between diff erent kinds of enhancements (i.e. 
cognitive enhancement, mood enhancement, physical enhancement, etc.) and our moral 
capacity, which is a precondition of the creation of a better world.
Indeed, would the world be a better place to live in if we all had IQs of over 200 or co-
uld run 100 m in just a matter of seconds? Not necessarily. So what we really need to do 
is to enhance our morality. Why not do it with biomedical means? To that end, Th omas 
Douglas introduces the idea of biomedical moral enhancement in order to question 
the fundamental bioconservative objection that the biotechnological modifi cation of 
human nature for the sake of enhancement would be morally impermissible (Douglas, 
2011:467). If it is possible to prove that the use of modern biotechnology could some-
how improve our morality so that we all become virtuous human beings, then there 
should not be any dispute about biomedical enhancement in general. Fukuyama’s con-
cerns regarding the disintegration of human dignity, or Factor X (Fukuyama, 2002:149), 
and Habermas’ worry about our ability to be responsible members of the community 
would then become irrelevant.
Th e aim of this paper is an attempt to widen perspectives regarding the problem of 
moral enhancement by investigating the tradition of moral philosophy.1 Hence, it is 
necessary to emphasise that the question of morality is inseparable from the “big” ba-
sic notions of good and evil. If we could enhance our morality, we would be able to 
eliminate or reduce bad actions which should result in a “better” world. Th us, the next 
question which imposes itself in this discussion is what kind of evil can we eliminate 
by morally enhancing ourselves and what kind of evil would we still have to live with? 
1 Th e paper starts from a “bioconservative” standpoint, accepting the concerns about biomedical enhan-
cement raised by Francis Fukuyama and Jürgen Habermas. Th us, we will not investigate the diff erences 
between technological and non-technological interventions in human nature further in this paper. A more 
detailed overview of this was already given in the book Ljudska priroda i nova epoha (Selak, 2013). Th e 
investigation of the possibility of the reduction of evil will rather be narrowed down to three classical na-
mes: Kant, Arendt and, fi nally, Leibniz because their understanding of evil can serve as an answer to the 
treatment of the problem of evil in the work of Th omas Douglas, Julian Savulescu, Ingmar Persson, and 
John Harris. 
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Due to the complexity and diversity of the philosophical analysis of evil, in order to 
propose an answer to this question we shall narrow our investigation. Consequently, 
our research on evil will be adjusted to conform to the implicit understanding of evil as 
suggested by some of the most prominent promoters of biomedical (moral) enhance-
ment (Th omas Douglas, Julian Savulescu, Ingmar Persson and John Harris). Th erefore, 
we consider two understandings of evil: evil as a component of human nature – radical 
evil (Kant), and “depersonalized” evil – the banality of evil (Arendt), which are taken as 
suitable theories for the purpose of this investigation.
Finally, the intention of Douglas’ investigation was to encourage the idea of human 
enhancement by introducing the possibility of moral enhancement. Th us, in this paper 
we will use Kant’s and Arendt’s understandings of evil to try to show the contrary: that 
the suggestion of biomedical moral enhancement exposes crucial contradictions of the 
idea of human enhancement in general. 
2. THE NATURALISATION OF EVIL ACCORDING TO DOUGLAS, 
PERSSON AND SAVULESCU 
In Moral Enhancement, Th omas Douglas, one of the pioneers of the idea of moral en-
hancement, does not defi ne morality, but rather identifi es certain psychological changes 
which could count as moral enhancement. Clearly, these emotions ought to be essential 
for our morality, otherwise we would not be able to count their enhancement as moral 
enhancement. Th e emotions which Douglas emphasises as ones that are “bad” or in-
compatible with moral behaviour are the “aversion to members of certain racial groups, 
and impulse towards violent aggression” (Douglas, 2011:470). His “weakly consequen-
tialist” position suggests that “we have good reasons to expectably bring about any good 
consequences” (Douglas, 2011:474). Th us, what would be regarded as moral enhance-
ment is if a person “alters herself in a way that may reasonably be expected to result in 
her having morally better future motives, taken in sum, than she would otherwise have 
had” (Douglas, 2011:468).
Similarly, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu claim that human beings are to an in-
suffi  cient degree psychologically and morally adapted to the new “technological” envi-
ronment, which represents a threat to the very survival of human civilisation (Persson 
and Savulescu, 2011:486). Human beings compete over a defi cit in natural resources, 
which implies that we are “condemned” to act in an evil manner. Today, we have beco-
me a danger to ourselves so we should improve our motivation to act in a good manner 
with biotechnological means. Persson and Savulescu also refer to a great deal of research 
which shows that our behaviour is biologically conditioned at least in part. Th ey reveal 
the biological base of altruism, a sense of justice and aggressive behaviour (Persson and 
Savulescu, 2012:109-112).
Th erefore, they indicate altruism (as empathy and sympathetic concern) and a sense of 
justice as the key moral dispositions that should be the fi rst object of biomedical moral 
enhancement (Persson and Savulescu, 2012:108).
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Douglas, Persson and Savulescu emphasise a view that suggests that our ability to act in 
both a good and bad way is an intrinsic part of our biological nature. Evil is therefore 
naturalised as an existing component of the human biological misbalance. Th is suggests 
that if we could somehow change the “chemistry” of our brain to have better motives, 
i.e. to have better intentions towards other human beings, we could “save” the world, 
or, at least, make a step in that direction.2 
3. REDUCTION OF EVIL BY IMPROVEMENT OF OUR 
MOTIVATION  THE KANTIAN ARGUMENT
Douglas, Persson and Savulescu see the improvement of our motivation to act in a good 
manner as crucial for our moral enhancement. Hence, Douglas emphasises a decrease 
in aversion both towards members of certain racial groups and in the impulse towards 
violent aggressive behaviour, and Persson and Savulescu focus on an increase in altruism 
and a sense of justice. Th e necessity of the “enhancement” of our motivation to act in 
accordance with the moral law can be seen as Kant’s standpoint on the question of the 
existence and the reduction of evil.
In Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason Kant discusses the problem of radical evil 
in human nature. Kant’s distinction between legality and morality from the Critique of 
Practical Reason is essential for his distinction between good and bad actions:
Th erefore the concept of duty demands objectively – in the action – agreement with the 
law, and subjectively – in the maxim of the action –  respect for the law, as the sole way of 
determining the will by the law. And thereon rests the distinction between the conscio-
usness of having acted in conformity with duty and from duty, i.e. from respect for the law. 
Th e fi rst of these (legality) is possible even if only inclinations were to have been the de-
termining bases of the will; but the second (morality), moral worth, must be posited solely 
in this, that the action is done from duty, i.e. only on account of the law (Kant, 2002:81).
Th us, in order to characterise one’s action as good or evil we should observe one’s mo-
tivation. A person is not necessarily good if a result of their action is good. If such a 
person has had impure motivation to commit this act of good, they can also be chara-
cterised as an evil person. For example, if one has done something to gain something for 
oneself, e.g. to deserve the respect of the community, one’s action is not good even if the 
life of a stranger is saved or if one gives all of one’s savings to charity.
According to Kant, a human being is evil because “he is conscious of the moral law 
and yet he has incorporated into his maxim the (occasional) deviation from it” (Kant, 
1998:32). Th e problem for Kant lies in the fact that we are by our nature condemned 
to have impure motivations. Although our intrinsic moral predisposition enables us 
to be good, we also have a natural predisposition that is related to our senses and the 
subjective principle of self-love. Hence, evil is radical because it corrupts the ground of 
2 To investigate similar concepts further, see evolutionary psychology and, for example, Steven Pinker’s 
book How the Mind Works. 
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all maxims while as a natural inclination it cannot be removed solely by human forces. 
“Yet it must equally be possible to overcome this evil, for it is found in the human being 
as acting freely” (Kant, 1998:37).
Th erefore, what characterises our doing good or evil is not in the material of the maxim 
(the diff erent impulses we feel), but rather in the form of the maxim (the question of 
subordination; which of these impulses are conditions for others) (Kant, 1998:36).
Th e victory of the good principle over the evil principle (Kant, 1998:93) and the new esta-
blishment of the intrinsic predisposition for good (meaning creating its purity) demands 
a “revolution in the disposition of the human being” (Kant, 1998:47) which is possible 
since “for the moral law commands that we ought to be better human beings now, it ines-
capably follows that we must be capable of being better human beings” (Kant, 1998:50).
Th is is partially in correlation with the requests of Douglas, Persson and Savulescu for 
the improvement of our motivation as a step towards moral enhancement. But, even if 
their argumentation was consistent with Kant’s, not all evil comes from our motivation. 
Enhanced motivation would not necessarily mean that we would have a safer and the-
refore a better world. Th e world is often in danger due to immoral actions that are the 
result of stupidity or indolence. Furthermore, new diseases, climate changes, etc., also 
threaten our existence. Following this argument, John Harris, one of the opponents of 
the idea of moral enhancement, and also a supporter of the idea of cognitive enhance-
ment, criticises Savulescu and Persson. Harris perceives moral enhancement as a threat 
to freedom (Harris, 2011:103-105), and uses the example of the decrease in racism over 
the last hundred years, which is the result of adequate public education, to advocate for 
cognitive enhancement instead of moral enhancement (Harris, 2011:105). Hence, the 
next question is could we decrease evil if we expanded our cognitive capacities?
4. REDUCTION OF EVIL BY IMPROVEMENT OF OUR 
COGNITION  THE ARENDTIAN ARGUMENT
John Harris suggests that cognitive enhancement will lead us to moral enhancement. If we 
know better, we will act better. Th e Socratic relation between knowledge and good is a key 
point of maybe the most famous 20th century defi nition of evil – that of Hannah Arendt.
In her research on the origin of evil, Hannah Arendt studied the politics of totalitarian 
systems (Hitler’s Nazi system and Stalin’s Bolshevik one) and discovered that “ideological” 
crimes, crimes that happen in the name of ideology, take place for the reason that an in-
dividual is deprived of the ability to think. Th is ensues when one refuses, or is not able, to 
engage with oneself in a vivid Socratic dialogue. Solitude is “the mode of existence present 
in this silent dialogue of myself with myself” (Arendt, 2003:98). Th is is essential for not 
committing an act of evil, since no one would be able to live with themselves aware of the 
fact that they are a “criminal”. Th erefore, Socratic morality is the only effi  cient morality in 
borderline situations, at times of crises and emergencies (Arendt, 2003:106). Th e rejection 
of inner dialogue occurs because totalitarian practice, step by step, annihilates personality 
and converts human beings into the obedient followers of the given orders.
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Following the tradition of moral philosophy, Arendt stresses that for humans it is im-
possible to do wicked things intentionally, to do evil for evil’s sake (Arendt, 2003:72). 
Th e connection between thinking and remembering is of special importance for Arendt 
(Arendt, 2003:94-97). Having no memory means that one has not thought about one’s 
action at all, therefore the biggest criminals are those who do not remember. Since they 
do not remember they do not have roots in this world and for Arendt this is how the 
greatest evil operates. Having no roots enables such evil to be extreme and spread across 
the world (Arendt, 2003:95). Arendt sees each individual as capable of going deep into 
morality, but is often led by circumstances to stay on the surface.3 Hence, the real dan-
ger Arendt fi nds is in indiff erence, in a refusal to judge at all and that is “the horror and 
the banality of evil” (Arendt, 2003:146).
Th ere is the possibility that an enlargement of our cognition would enable us to see 
subtle shades of our actions better. But, are the smartest people necessarily the best ones? 
Or is the case just the opposite? We can fi nd numerous examples, even starting from the 
fi eld of philosophy, of vague morality and an excellent mind, from J. J. Rousseau and 
further. Harris indeed shares a rather optimistic position: he assumes that humanity is 
by nature good, just not well-educated. On the other hand, he is right that a proper 
education in the 20th century has led to a decrease in prejudices, although if we would 
take a “morality pill” to prevent us from being aggressive and to make us altruistic, what 
we think or know would no longer be important.
Starting from Socrates, the connection between knowing and acting morally is recogni-
sed as important. Knowing better is a precondition of acting morally, but that is only 
the starting point. For example, having the ability to run fast is worth nothing if you 
do not run. Similarly, we could agree that the purpose of cognition is thinking about 
what is good and from such knowing acting in a good manner. Knowing better, as a 
precondition of not blindly following our selfi sh impulses, suggests that the idea of 
moral education indeed has a certain intrinsic value which could mean that cognitive 
enhancement has priority over or enables moral enhancement. Would we then be able 
to eliminate evil by enhancing our cognition so that we learn about and consequentially 
understand more diff erent things, which would enable us to better recognise evil and 
therefore prevent it?
5. TOWARDS A CONCLUSION: IS THE REDUCTION OF EVIL 
REALLY NECESSARY?  THE LEIBNIZIAN ARGUMENT
When we think about evil we usually start with the idea that it should be reduced, 
which explains the need for moral enhancement. But do we really mean that? In our 
everyday lives we work more on the justifi cation of evil than on its reduction, i.e. we 
tend to rationalise something bad that has happened to us as a road to a greater good. 
3 A further investigation should include the way in which socioeconomic, cultural and political circum-
stances aff ect our moral “capacity”.
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For instance, we can justify the fact that someone has broken our leg by emphasising 
the positive consequences of the fact that we were in bed for a month. It enabled us to 
read ten books and appreciate walking more. We do not just excuse the bad things that 
happen to us, we also tend to rationalise our own bad behaviour by, perhaps, thinking 
that we have actually done someone a favour (e.g. stealing a friend’s boyfriend would 
actually help them get rid of an “idiot”). Th is is what Kant calls “a certain perfi dy on the 
part of the human heart (dolus malus) in deceiving itself as regards its own good or evil 
disposition” which is “the foul stain of our species” (Kant, 1998:38).
If there is some good in the bad things that happen, or if we can fi nd some kind of sense 
in them, do we then need to work on moral enhancement?
Th is can be called the implementation of Leibniz’s argument.4 When something really 
bad happens to us, we tend to fall under Leibniz’s “umbrella” by explaining that for 
some reason it had to happen that way.5 In his Th eodicy6 Leibniz puts God on trial and 
tries to defend the coexistence of God as an absolute good and the existence of evil. For 
Leibniz evil is a part of God’s big plan. Th is world is the “best of all possible worlds” 
which means that God was led by his wisdom when he created evil (Leibniz, 2007:69).
Evil often causes good that otherwise would not happen (Leibniz, 2007:10). Th e reason 
why we do not always see this is that we have limited knowledge. Leibniz states that 
human beings are selected not by their virtues but in their accordance with God’s plan. 
He makes a comparison by using a stone of lesser quality while building because it is “a 
particular one for fi lling a certain gap” (Leibniz, 2007:105). Furthermore, to show a di-
ff erent perspective on a problem Leibniz shares his surprise not by the fact that humans 
get sick, but by the fact they do not get sick more often since they have such a weak 
body (Leibniz, 2007:14). While trying to comprehend good and bad we unavoidably 
face the problem of perception and the perspective human being, by nature, is able to 
have only a very narrow perspective.
Th erefore, Leibniz fi nds the origin of evil in the genuine imperfection of the human be-
ing. Since we descend from God we inevitably have to have a lower level of perfection. 
Th at is what makes us limited in a way. We cannot know everything and we can make 
mistakes. Leibnitz calls this kind of evil metaphysical evil (Leibniz, 2007:21). Unlike 
physical and moral evil, metaphysical evil is inherent to human beings and cannot be 
eliminated. Th e metaphysical possibility of sin is given with freedom when it is created 
and it enables humans to cooperate in the creating activity of God since we conform to 
the will of God with our free decisions.
4 We can fi nd a similar thesis in the philosophies of Plato, Augustine and Th omas Aquinas, but Leibniz has 
made this argument central to his investigation of the origin of evil. Th erefore, for the purpose of this paper 
we have decided to use his theodicy as an example.
5 Odo Marquard extends this justifi cation to the foundation of philosophical anthropology where the we-
akness of our “biological” nature is seen as an advantage. We compensate for our biological weakness with 
the creation of culture and institutions (Marquard, 1991).
6 Due to the comprehensiveness of his theodicy, Svendsen calls Leibniz’s theodicy the “totality theodicy” 
(Svendsen, 2010:55).
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Th is, of course, does not mean that we should not do anything as God already has a fi ni-
shed plan for us. Leibniz dedicated a large part of his Th eodicy to fi ght against the Fatum 
mahometanum in order to defeat “lazy reason” (Leibniz, 2007:55) and to emphasise the 
importance of the causes which lead to the realisation of an action. What we do is also a 
part of what will happen. Th erefore, only after doing all we could in the right direction 
are we entitled to accept the good and the bad as the result of our actions.
Th e importance of Leibniz’s argument for the moral enhancement debate is in the fact 
that Leibniz reminds us that human beings have only limited knowledge. We are not 
able to comprehend all the consequences of our actions. Th erefore, we should act cau-
tiously. Following Persson and Savulescu’s explanation of the world being in danger, we 
must ask the question of how did this happen? Persson and Savulescu give a plausible 
explanation:
We are inclined to believe that at the time, half a century ago or so, when scientifi c 
technology provided us with means of causing Ultimate Harm, technological develop-
ment reached a stage at which it became worse all things considered for us to have the 
current means of scientifi c technology, given that we are not capable of handling them 
in a moral responsible way (Persson and Savulescu, 2012:127).
Even more, this “world being in danger” serves as an explanation of the need for moral 
enhancement. But we should also ask why did this happen. Did it happen because a 
strange force called “scientifi c technology” came out of space and gave us a destructive 
weapon, or had we created it and used it, which therefore makes us responsible for 
pursuing techno-scientifi c progress without paying attention to the consequences of 
our actions?
Furthermore, how can the very same thing that has caused the problem (the alliance of 
advanced techno-science and not-so progressive human morality) be its solution? How 
can the ideas of a techno-scientifi c realisation of Bacon’s philosophy (the idea that natu-
re should be at the disposal of human beings), and recently the exposure of human life 
to being at the mercy of a biotechnical revolution, correct the problems that arise from 
their implementation?
6. CONCLUSION. WHAT IS A BETTER WORLD?
Th e debate on the origin and existence of evil is one of the oldest in philosophy. If we 
position the standpoints of Douglas, Persson, Savulescu and Harris regarding this classi-
cal discussion we can perceive that each one seems to be able to eliminate one possible 
source of evil, but is left without a solution to the others. Furthermore, if we investigate 
their positions more thoroughly we can see that by imposing biomedical means as a so-
lution to the problem of evil they fail even in the removal of the sort of evil that appears 
as their target area.
Douglas, Persson and Savulescu fail to “follow” Kant’s direction because the question of 
motivation is inseparable from the free will to act in accordance with moral law. Kant 
would never agree to taking a biomedical shortcut as a mediator between our free will 
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and the moral law. A duty to follow the moral law in a Kantian sense requires practicing 
choice, which would not be possible if we would take a “morality pill” and then be inc-
lined to make the “better” choice:
But lest anyone be immediately scandalized by the expression nature, which would 
stand in direct contradiction to the predicates morally good or morally evil if taken to 
mean (as it usually does) the opposite of the ground of actions (arising) from freedom, let 
it be noted that by “the nature of a human being” we only understand here the subjecti-
ve ground wherever it may lie – of the exercise of the human being’s freedom in general 
(under objective moral laws) antecedent to every deed that falls within the scope of the 
senses. But this subjective ground must, in turn, itself always be a deed of freedom (for 
otherwise the use or abuse of the human being’s power of choice with respect to the mo-
ral law could not be imputed to him, nor could the good or evil in him be called “mo-
ral”). Hence the ground of evil cannot lie in any object determining the power of choice 
through inclination, not in any natural impulses, but only in a rule that the power of 
choice itself produces for the exercise of its freedom, i.e. in a maxim (Kant, 1998:21).
Furthermore, Harris has an advantage over the promoters of moral enhancement becau-
se he suggests that there is some work to be done in order to act morally. It is bad and 
dangerous just to take a pill and become better, for the reason that it could undermine 
our freedom. Hence, in Harris’ recognition of what we have called an Arendtian expla-
nation of evil reduction, he emphasises the importance of gradualism. First you have 
to know better, then you will be able to act well. Also, you have to think yourself, and 
use your free will to decide on a good or bad action. Th e only “problem” is that this is 
actually an argument in favour of bioconservative thought, since it, even better, includes 
a couple of steps more. Following this line of argumentation, the more eff ort you invest, 
the better you are. So, to morally enhance yourself you need to have some knowledge, 
but to have some knowledge you must study hard; no shortcuts allowed – no pill for 
morality also means no pill for cognition. Th is is how Harris falls into a contradiction: 
when he wants to reject biomedical moral enhancement with the argument that we 
actually need cognitive enhancement, which will then lead to moral enhancement, the 
same claim of gradualism also appears destructive for his very own position. Biomedical 
cognitive enhancement, from Arendt’s perspective, would undermine the gradualism 
necessary for an inner dialogue which would bring it close to totalitarian practice.
Finally, Leibniz, in his search for “balance”, reminds us that good and evil are not as 
opposite as they can appear at fi rst sight. Th is balance is fragile and its violation could 
have dangerous consequences about which we should have already had learned somet-
hing in the past. As human knowledge is limited, when a human being ignores the cau-
tion which arises from the fact that one possesses only particular knowledge, the other 
side of newly liberated destructive power is revealed where it is not possible to predict 
the consequences of its usage and to take responsibility for them.
Kant’s, Arendt’s and Leibniz’s understanding of evil are complementary. As Kant put 
it: people act badly because they have impure motivation – they put their self-interest 
before common interest. As Arendt further explained: they are able to do so, to live with 
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the “criminal”, because they refuse (or are disabled) to encounter themselves, to think 
about their actions. And, as Leibnitz has concluded: even when having a good motiva-
tion and thinking about our actions we are still not able to eliminate evil because we 
actually have no idea what we are really doing – we do not completely comprehend the 
consequences of our actions. Similarly, the promotion of Douglas, Persson, Savulescu 
and Harris of (moral or cognitive) biomedical enhancement cannot be separated becau-
se in their proposals of diff erent kinds of enhancements as the means for reducing evil, 
they all share the same weak spot – the need for biomedical enhancement. Regarding 
this, the idea of moral enhancement does not show that the fundamental bioconser-
vative objection of the moral impermissibility of biomedical enhancement in general 
is ungrounded. One could argue that it shows just the opposite. By putting morality, 
which is inseparable from the notion of freedom, at the centre of the human enhan-
cement discussion, it reveals crucial unresolved contradictions in the idea of human 
enhancement in general. Th e questions which remain unanswered by the promotors of 
human enhancement are exactly those which are at the centre of Kant’s, Arendt’s and 
Leibniz’s philosophical work: what is actually good and evil and what can / should we 
do about it. Th at is the reason why it is important to come back and to take into consi-
deration this often neglected philosophical tradition. Th e tradition of moral philosophy 
used in this paper reminds us how dangerous the consequences of allowing human be-
ings to become experimental objects of their own research using the “moral blackmail” 
argument of the better world creation could be, if we at the same time undermine the 
inseparability of the most important components of morality. Th is same tradition also 
hides the answer to the question posed in the title of this paper: “How can a world 
become a better place?”.
In Responsibility and Judgement Hannah Arendt emphasised Kant’s statement that we 
can defeat egoism by using plurality as the framework for a kind of thinking in which 
the self, instead of dealing with itself as if it were the whole world, sees itself as a citizen 
of the world (Arendt, 2003:143). In Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason Kant 
further explained that:
A juridico-civil (political) state is the relation of human beings to each other inasmuch 
as they stand jointly under public juridical laws (which are all coercive laws). An et-
hico-civil state is one in which they are united under laws without being coerced, i.e. 
under laws of virtue alone (Kant, 1998:95).
If we really want to create this better world as an ethico-civil state, it is important to 
emphasise Kant’s point once more from Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 
that we already have all the ingredients necessary (Kant, 1998:50), so there is no need 
for new risky inventions. We just have to mix them together in the right way. Yes, that 
is the trick, and the problem, but it is also where all the fun starts: discovering the “ba-
nality” of the paradox of having all we need but not knowing (comprehending) what 
we have.
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U cilju davanja što šire slike vezano za temu moralnog poboljšanja, u radu se pitamo koje je oblike zla mo-
guće eliminirati kroz moralno poboljšanje, odnosno koji bi oblici zla i dalje opstali. S obzirom na složenost 
i raznolikost fi lozofskih analiza zla, naš će fokus biti nešto uži, pa ćemo se baviti implicitnim razumijeva-
njem zla nekolicine najistaknutijih zagovornika biomedicinskog (moralnog) poboljšanja. Usporedit ćemo 
dvije perspektive zla: zlo kao sastavni aspekt ljudske prirode – radikalno zlo (Immanuel Kant) i „deperso-
nalizirano“ zlo – banalnost zla (Hannah Arendt), kao i implicitna razmatranja zla u radovima Th omasa 
Douglasa, Juliana Savulescua, Ingmara Perssona i Johna Harrisa. Nadalje, koristit ćemo „Teodiceju“ Go-
ttfrieda Wilhelma Leibniza u analizi nužnosti redukcije zla, kako bismo naglasili činjenicu da je ljudsko 
znanje ograničeno, što svakako trebamo uzeti u obzir pri razmatranju principa opreza i lomljive ravnoteže 
između dobra i zla. U zaključku pokušavamo podati odgovor na pitanje: „Što je to bolji svijet?“, uzimajući 
u obzir često zanemarenu tradiciju moralne fi lozofi je u djelima Immanuela Kanta i Hanne Arendt.
Ključne riječi: moralno poboljšanje, zlo, Immanuel Kant, Hannah Arendt, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
MORALISCHE VERBESSERUNG ODER ÜBELREDUKTION: IST 
EINE BESSERE WELT MÖGLICH?
Marija Selak
Zusammenfassung
Um ein möglichst umfangreiches Bild zum Th ema moralische Verbesserung zu geben, fragen wir uns in 
dieser Arbeit danach, welche Formen des Übels man durch eine moralische Verbesserung eliminieren kann, 
bzw. welche Formen des Übels auch weiterhin bestehen würden. Hinsichtlich der Komplexität und der 
Verschiedenartigkeit von philosophischen Analysen des Übels, werden wir uns darauf enger fokussieren und 
uns mit dem impliziten Verständnis des Übels einiger der eminentesten Befürworter der biomedizinischen 
(moralischen) Verbesserung befassen. Wir werden zwei Perspektiven des Übels vergleichen: das Übel als 
ein Bestandsaspekt der menschlichen Natur – radikales Übel (Immanuel Kant) und „depersonalisiertes“ 
Übel – die Banalität des Übels (Hannah Arendt), sowie die impliziten Betrachtungen des Übels in den 
Werken von Th omas Douglas, Julian Savulescu, Ingmar Persson und John Harris. Weiterhin werden wir 
uns der Th eodizee von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz bei der Aanalyse der Notwendigkeit der Übelreduktion 
bedienen, um die Tatsache zu betonen, dass das menschliche Wissen beschränkt ist, was wir bei der Betra-
chtung der Vorsichtsprinzipien und des zerbrechlichen Gleichgewichts zwischen Gut und Übel unbedingt 
berücksichtigen müssen. Zum Schluß versuchen wir, die Frage zu beantworten: „Eine bessere Welt? – Was 
ist das“, indem wir die oft vernachlässigte Tradition der Moralphilosophie in den Werken von Immanuel 
Kant und Hannah Arendt in Rücksicht nehmen.
Schlüsselwörter: Moralische Verbesserung, Übel, Immanuel Kant, Hannah Arendt, Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz
